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Abstract
It is well-known that individuals born in different periods of time (cohorts) exhibit different wealth
accumulation paths. While previous studies have used cohort dummies to proxy for this fact, research in this
area suffers from a serious identification problem, i.e., how to disentangle age, time, and cohort effects from
a simple cross-section or a time series of cross-sections.
In this paper we propose to go beyond the simple use of cohort dummies to capture the differences in
wealth accumulation across individuals born in different time periods. We introduce two indicators of the
economic conditions under which households accumulate wealth. The first one represents productivity
differences across cohorts: the aggregate level of GNP per capita when the head of the household entered
the labor market. The second measure summarizes the changes in Social Security during the head of
household’s working life. The use of these indicators also gets around the identification problem.
We estimate the model using panel data from the Netherlands. This is a country whose historical
conditions are ideal to study the effects of productivity growth and Social Security. The Netherlands
experienced a steady growth after World War II. At the same time, it also built up a very extensive welfare
system. Our empirical findings show that productivity growth goes a long way in explaining differences in
income across cohorts. Productivity growth and Social Security can explain most, if not all, of the differences
in wealth holdings of different cohorts. In comparison with the cohorts that lived without Social Security for
a portion of their working life, the cohorts that had Social Security throughout their working life have less
than half the accumulation rate of older cohorts.
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1. Introduction
There exists an important debate in the macroeconomic literature on the determinants of saving and
wealth accumulation and how one can explain, for example, the sharp decline in saving that many developed
countries witnessed during the 1980s. Some researchers have argued that it is simply the aging of the
population that has caused the decline in saving. These might be called age efsects.  Others have argued that
people coming of age in different times have different preferences. They argue, for example, that generations
born after the Great Depression are less thrifty or less alert to risk than previous generations. An alternative
view is that preferences may be identical across cohorts, but that the economic conditions of the past are very
different from the present and that these differences are reflected in differences in wealth holdings across
generations. Whether it is preferences or economic conditions, these considerations lead to the supposition
of cohort or generation efsects.  Yet another group of researchers have instead argued that it is the capital
gains in the stock market and the housing market that explain the decline in saving. These might be called
time efsects.’ While all these theories have strengths and weaknesses, the critical issue is: how can we
distinguish among age, cohort, and time effects?*
In this paper, we tackle this issue by examining household wealth holdings over the life cycle. In
particular, we study whether there are differences in the wealth profiles across cohorts and whether these
differences can be attributed to economic factors such as productivity growth and changes in Social Security
provisions.
It is well known that in cross-sectional data one cannot disentangle age and cohort effects in wealth.
Shorrocks (1975) was the first to point out that productivity growth creates differences in household wealth
holdings. Thus, solely on the basis of cross-sectional data one cannot study issues such as whether the elderly
draw down wealth. A few authors have instead used time series of cross sections to study the behavior of
wealth or saving.3  They estimate a wealth or saving equation as a function of age dummies (or a polynomial
in age) and cohort dummies. Additionally, one would like to include time dummies; however, this introduces
an identification problem: calendar time is equal to year of birth (cohort) plus age.
Some authors, such as Attanasio (1993, 1998),  simply acknowledge this identification problem and show
’ For a detailed discussion of these explanations, see Browning and Lusardi (1996).
*  See Heckman and Robb  (1985) for a detailed analysis of this issue.
3 See Attanasio (1993),  Deaton and Paxson (1994a),  Venti and Wise (1993),  and Jappelli (1995). See, also,
Attanasio (1998) for a very thorough analysis of saving using time series of cross sections.
that one can only identify the age profile of the changes in saving and not the changes in wealth. Others
impose restrictions on the time dummies. The leading approach is the one of Deaton and Paxson  (1994b) in
the context of a life cycle-permanent income model for consumption. They assume that the coefficients
corresponding to the time dummies add up to zero and are orthogonal to a time trend. One possible
justification for this assumption is that time effects are due to macro shocks and average out over time.
In this paper we address the identification problem in a different way. We make use of the restrictions
stemming from a fairly standard version of the permanent income-life cycle hypothesis (PI-LCH).4  More
specifically, we consider the argument of other authors that productivity growth is an important factor in
explaining differences across cohorts and model it in the context of the PI-LCH. Similarly, the model
suggests that changes in Social Security (SS) provisions over the life time will affect savings in predictable
ways. Rather than using cohort dummies, we model the cohort effects as a function of the productivity of
different cohorts and of the extent of SS faced by different cohorts. Productivity of a cohort is proxied by
the aggregate level of gross national product per capita when the head of the household entered the labor
market (which we take to be age 22). SS is proxied by a measure which summarizes the changes in the SS
.
system during the working life.
The advantages of using these measures rather than cohort dummies are several. Not only do we overcome
the identification problem, but we can also determine more clearly the causes for the differences in income
and wealth holdings across cohorts.’ While many potential reasons have been proposed for explaining these
differences, simple cohort dummies cannot distinguish, for example, between changes in economic
circumstances and changes in preferences.
We estimate the model using panel data from the Netherlands. This is a country whose historical
conditions are ideal to study the effects of productivity growth and SS. The Netherlands experienced a steady
growth after World War II. At the same time, it also built up a very extensive welfare system! Both
conditions can have important effects on household -wealth accumulation. In our empirical work, we first
consider the effect of productivity growth on household income and find that it explains a substantial part
of the differences in age-income profiles across cohorts. We then consider household wealth. Our empirical
findings show that productivity growth and SS can explain most, if not all, of the differences in the wealth
4See  the discussion of this approach in Heckman and Robb (1985).
‘The  idea to relate cohort  effects to observable cohort  specific variables has been applied by several other authors,
including Heckman and Robb (1985),  Moffit (1987),  Jonsson and Klevmarken (1978),  and Klevmarken (1993).
6 For detail, see van Ark, de Haan,  and de Jong (1996).
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accumulation of different cohorts.
To summar&  in this paper, we argue that past economic circumstances can explain the variation in paths
of wealth accumulation across cohorts. In particular, our empirical work reinforces the findings of others,
such as Shorrocks (1975) and Feldstein (1974),  that productivity growth and Social Security are important
determinants of wealth. In addition, we propose a parametrization of the cohort effect, that can get around
the identification problem that is typically encountered in many studies. This strategy has wide applications
and can be extended to other economic problems.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we consider the effect of productivity growth and SS on
wealth. In Section 3, we describe the data set and examine the main features of wealth and income over the
life cycle. In Sections 4 and 5, we describe the econometric specification and present our empirical results.
In Section 6, we conclude and discuss further directions of research.
2. Theoretical framework
The model underlying our analysis is the simple PI-LCH. It serves as a framework of analysis and as a
guide to construct our empirical variables. In this model, agents accumulate wealth to smooth consumption
over the life cycle. In particular, we expect agents to continue to accumulate until retirement and then start
drawing down assets. Under some restrictive assumptions (e.g. quadratic preferences, complete certainty,
equality of the rate of time preference and the interest rate),7  we can derive the closed-form solutions for both
consumption and wealth. The expression for consumption is as follows:
(1)
where c,  and y,  indicate consumption and non-capital income at age t, r is the interest rate which is assumed
to be fixed, 4-i is non-human wealth in the previous period, and L is the length of life. Consumption is
simply equal to permanent income, i.e., the present discounted value of lifetime resources. In this particular
case, where there is complete certainty and the interest rate is equal to the discount rate, we obtain that
consumption is simply constant over the life cycle. Wealth at age t is equal to accumulated saving:
7 Most results concerning the effect of productivity growth can be obtained while relaxing some of these
assumptions. However, what i.s critic al is that consumption remains a linear function of permanent income.
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Under reasonable assumptions about the behavior of income (rising income during the working years and
a drop after retirement), the model gives the usual well-known prediction that wealth increases up to
retirement and decreases thereafter.
If we introduce uncertainty into the model and interpret time effects as surprises in income, we can show
that if at age t income exceeds its expectation, this will have a positive effect on wealth at age t (see
Appendix A, equation (AS)). Thus, the model can illustrate in a straightforward way the existence of age
and time effects in wealth accumulation. To illustrate cohort effects, we need a slightly more elaborate
analysis.
2.1 Productivity growth
To examine the effect of productivity growth on wealth holdings of different cohorts, we compare wealth
levels at age t of two different generations: c,  (the younger cohort) and c, (the older cohort) in the presence
of productivity growth. We consider a simple case of productivity growth by modeling the income of
households h and i belonging to two different cohorts as follows:
cl
b h 1nY
c2 G
c2
t- ti= cl + ($zi (3)
where c,“f is a constant specific to the cohorts c,  and c,  and O,j represents all other sources of differences
between the incomes of households h and i, e.g. due- to differences in education of the household head, the
number of earners, etc. Importantly, O,j is not a function of the cohorts to which these households belong.
Thus (3) states that ceteris paribus at any age t the earnings of the two cohorts differ by a constant of
proportionality, reflecting, for example, the higher salary at the start of the career of the younger cohort cl.*
If every generation starts with zero initial wealth, then (1) and (2) immediately imply that ceteris paribus the
relative differences in consumption and wealth at age t between cohorts c,  and c, are both equal to the
relative difference in income. In other words, the parallel shift in income of cohort c,  relative to cohort c,
*  See Deaton (1995) for a similar assumption about the impact of productivity growth on the income process.
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induces a parallel shift in the consumption profile, and accumulated wealth increases by the same magnitude.
This also implies that while we have cohort effects in levels of wealth and consumption, the saving rate or
the ratio of wealth to income (or consumption) will not display any cohort effects.’ While this model seems
rather restrictive, it makes explicit the assumptions made in many of the previous works on consumption and
wealth, and the justification behind the use of simple cohort dummies.
2.2 Social Security
While productivity growth is an important explanation for why wealth holdings differ across generations,
in particular for those economies that experienced a high degree of economic growth, there are other
economic events affecting the size of accumulation across different generations. In western societies the most
important of these other factors is the introduction of an extensive SS system. In the Netherlands a universal
SS system was instituted in 1957 and our data set includes households who were in the labor market well
before the introduction of the system.”
SS wealth represents a very important component of total household wealth holdings. According to our
calculations, total net worth for households whose head is 65-69 years old (in 1987) is approximtaley Dutch
Guilders ( Dfl) 440,000, and more than Dfl 228,000 is accounted for by Social Security (medians are Dfl
354,200 and Dfl246,700  respectively). Other age groups show similar results. Thus, half of total wealth of
the elderly is accounted for by SS in the Netherlands. I1
We have investigated the effect of the introduction and changes in Social Security when we allow for
uncertainty about future income. Under the assumption that both the introduction of the SS system and
subsequent changes are unanticipated (or equivalently, that all shocks are permanent), Appendix A
investigates the effect of the introduction and changes in SS on consumption and wealth accumulation in the
framework of the permanent income model. The unanticipated changes in SS creates a reduction in
household (private) wealth. On the basis of the analysis in appendix A a proxy variable is formulated which
captures the effect of the introduction and changes in SS on wealth holdings. This proxy variable is used in
9 See, also, Deaton and Paxson (1994b),  Paxson (1996),  and Jappelli (1995).
lo The General Old Pension Act (AOVV)  of 1957 introduced Social Security to the entire Dutch
pension provisions were present even before 1957, but they were restricted to some small group
mainly the very poor and civil servants. See, also, van Ark, de Haan,  and de Jong (1996).
“For  detail, see Alessie, Lusardi, and Kapteyn (1995).
5
popula t ion .
s  of  the pop
S o m e
lulation,
the empirical part of this paper.
In Figures la and 1 b, we provide a simple illustration of the effects generated by the introduction of SS.
We consider three individuals. The first individual (who is a representative of the “old cohort”) lived in a
time without SS. The second individual (a representative of the “middle aged cohort”) was 50 years old when
the SS system was first introduced. The third individual (a representative of the “young cohort”) was 35
when SS was introduced. For simplicity, in these figures we assume that, after its introduction, the level of
SS-benefits remains constant. The income profiles of the middle aged and young cohorts are different from
the old one, since the former generations know that they will receive retirement benefits when they stop
working. Due to the introduction of SS, savings by the middle aged as well as the young cohorts is shifted
downwards (from age 50 and age 35 on). Wealth changes accordingly. In comparison with the old cohort,
wealth is lower for the middle aged (young) cohort from age 50 (age 35) onwards. Note that the effect is not
simply additive as in the case of productivity growth, but there is an interaction between age and cohort
effects in the accumulation of wealth. The decrease in wealth is not just a parallel shift, but changes with the
age of the head of the household.
This is another important aspect of modeling cohort effects using the predictions of the theory. This
derivation highlights  that it is very restrictive to use cohort dummies to model cohort effects, since it is easy
to envisage cases where the effect is not simply additive, but, as in the case of SS, there are interactions
between cohort and age effects. In addition, cohort dummies can be rather difficult to interpret when as in
these examples, some past economic conditions (productivity growth) lead to an increase in wealth across
cohorts, while others (SS) to a decrease. For policy considerations, it may be very important to disentangle
those effects in the data.
While the basic framework here is the PI-LCH, qualitatively the findings concerning the effects of
productivity growth and SS on consumption and savings will also hold under different models, such as a
precautionary saving model or a model with uncertain life time or a bequest motive. The effect of these
extensions is to induce extra motives to save during the working life and to reduce decumulation after
retirement in comparison with the current model, but decumulation may still be expected beyond a certain
age (see, e.g., Hurd (1989, 1998),  and Browning and Lusardi (1996)). Apart from that, productivity growth
and SS have effects on wealth accumulation in the same direction as in the current model. We use the model
simply as a framework for the analysis and as a guide to devise the variables to be used in the empirical
estimation.
Another simplification in the model introduced above is the absence of labor supply responses, as utility
is assumed to depend on consumption only. In a model with both consumption and leisure in the utility
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function in a non-separable way, one expects an effect of the introduction of SS on the timing of retirement
and hence on the savings rate during one’s working life: the introduction of SS increases lifetime resources
for the older cohorts (the expected present discounted value of their SS benefits is greater than the value of
the extra payroll tax). This increase in lifetime resources may conceivably be consumed in the form of more
leisure, e.g., through early retirement. This in itself increases the need to save for retirement and hence may
offset the depressing effect of SS on savings. l2
3. The data
3.1 Description of the Socio-Economic Panel
The empirical work is based on the Netherlands Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), conducted by Statistics
Netherlands. It is a micro data set representative of the total population, excluding those living in special
institutions like nursing homes. The first survey was conducted in April 1984. The same households were
interviewed again in October 1984 and then twice a year (in April and October) until 1989. In the years since
1990, all the information was collected in one interview, which was held in May of each year. In the October
interview, information was collected on socioeconomic characteristics: demographics, income, labor market
participation and hours of work. In the April interview, information was collected on socio-economic
characteristics as in the October interview, but, rather than collecting data about income, from 1987 onwards,
information was collected on assets and liabilities. In this paper, we use income data from 1984 until 1990,
and wealth data from 1987 until 199 1. l3
An evaluation of the quality of the SEP data and a comparison with macro statistics or other micro data
sets is reported in Alessie, Lusardi and Aldershof (1997). We can briefly summarize their findings as follows:
the data on some major components of wealth, such as housing, mortgage debt, and checking accounts are
well reported in the SEP and compare reasonably well with aggregate statistics. However, some other
components, in particular stocks, bonds, and savings accounts seem under-reported in the SEP, and the level
of measurement error may also change over time. This problem is typical of wealth surveys and can be found
‘* See, for example, Diamond and Hausman (1984).
l3 All money values have been deflated using the Consumer Price Index and are expressed in 1987 Dutch guilders.
The exchange rate between Dutch Guilders and US dollars was 2.03 in 1987 (2.03 Dfl=l$).
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in other similar  data sets.14
We have deleted from the sample those cases with missing or incomplete responses in the assets and
liabilities components and in the demographics.‘5 We have also excluded the self-employed from the sample.
The quality of the wealth data is very poor for these households, and additionally, wealth data for the self-
employed are not available after 1989. Due to these selections, we find that both low and high wealth
households have a tendency to drop out of the sample. We will take selectivity into account in our empirical
work.
3.2 Household income
In this section we report some basic facts about income. In particular, we first examine whether there is
evidence of productivity growth in the raw data. In order to construct some simple statistics for households
in the same year of birth (cohorts), we have re-arranged the data as follows: We have defined eleven cohorts
by choosing a 5 year-of-birth interval and have considered all households, from the ones born in 191 l-1 516
(they are 72-76 years old in 1987) until the ones who represent the last wave of the baby-boom generation
(they are born in 1961-65 and are 22-26 years old in 1987).”
Over the years, there has been a steady decrease in the average family size. Younger cohorts have
substantially reduced the size of their family relative to older generations. This change in family size is
composed of several effects. Not only has the number of children decreased, but there has also been a
decrease in the number of married couples. The percentage of married couples went from 70.4 in 1984 to
61.6 in 199 1. These facts are not inconsequential for income and for wealth accumulation, and we will take
them into account in the empirical work.
In Figures 2a and 2b,  we plot mean and median non-capital income from 1984 to 1990 for each cohort.
l4 See Davies (1979), Avery, Elliehausen, and Kennickell (1988),  Avery and Kennickell (199 l), and Hurst, Luoh, and
Stafford (1998).
l5 In some cases, missing data on assets and liabilities could be imputed. See Camphuis (1993) for more details on the
data imputation and Alessie, Lusardi and Aldershof (1997) for a description of the criteria used to calculate total net
worth.
1 Menever we speak of the age of a household we mean the age of the head of the household.
I7 For a detailed explanation of this methodology, see Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) and Attanasio (1993, 1998).
Note that we have deleted the households whose head is younger than 22 (in 1987) to exclude the persons still in school,
and the households whose head is older than 76 (in 1987) to partly avoid the strong correlation between mortality and
wealth holdings.
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For clarity, the graphs only indicate the average year when the head of the household was born (for example,
“38” refers to heads of households born between 1936 and 1940). The vertical difference between lines
measures the “cohort-time” effect. The difference along the same line measures the “age-time” effect?
The figures show that there are both cohort-time and age-time effects in income. As mentioned before,
productivity growth in the economy could induce generation effects in wages and income. Indeed, non-capital
income has been increasing strongly across cohorts up to the households born in 1928 or earlier. The biggest
cohort-time effect is between the cohort born between 1936-1940  and the one born between 1931-1935.19
The age-time effect is also large. In particular, the young and middle-age households experience a sizable
increase in non-capital income as they move along in their career.
The effects across generations could simply reflect the changes in the labor force participation of Dutch
households. For example, female labor force participation has been increasing over time, and the fraction
of families with two earners has increased considerably. The SEP data show that there has been a substantial
increase in the labor force participation among young couples and there is a strong cohort-time effect for
couples whose head is 50 years or younger. In Figure 3, we report mean non-capital income per income
recipient (results are similar for median non-capital income per income recipient). As expected, the increase
in labor market participation accounts for part of the cohort-time and the age-time effect. However, these
effects are still present in the data per earner; thus, there also appears to be evidence for productivity growth
in individual income.
3.3 Financial and total net worth
We use two measures of household net worth: financial net worth and total net worth. The first measure
is obtained by summing the amounts reported in checking accounts, saving certificates, bonds, stocks, options
and other such securities, cars, claims against private persons and subtracting the total amount of debt (which
is composed of loans and credit, installment credit, other debt and loans).20  Total net worth is obtained by
adding to fmancial net worth the value of the house and other real estate, the home-owner’s insurance policy,
l8  We use this  terminology to emphasize that  i t  is  not  possible  to  disentangle age from cohort and time effects in  these
figures. See also below.
I9 Historically, wage controls were implemented in the 1950s  but these controls were lifted in the early 1960s and
wages grew substantially in that period. Growth came to a halt in the 1970s with two severe recessions.
**  The reason why we include durables, such as cars, in this definition of wealth is
between car loans and other  debts .
because we cannot d is t inguish
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and subtracting the mortgage debt. We consider these two measures of wealth to study in some detail the
importance and role of housing equity.
In Table 1 we report the distribution of financial and total net worth in 1987 and 1991. A few facts can
be noticed from this table. First, there is substantial dispersion in household wealth holdings, with about 9%
of the households having a negative net worth. Second, the fact that means are well below the medians
suggests that the distributions of financial and total net worth are skewed to the right. Third, both financial
and total net worth have increased substantially in the five-year period. Note that not only means and medians
increased, but also standard deviations went up, indicating that the distribution of wealth is more dispersed
in 1991 than in 1987. Fourth, it is clear by looking at differences between financial and total net worth that
housing equity plays an important role in the portfolio and wealth accumulation of many Dutch households.
We have also looked at wealth holdings across types of households. Differences are sizable. While single-
person households report median total net worth of Dfl 5,500 in 1987, married couples report 5 times as
much (the median is Dfl 28,9OO).*l  Furthermore, the presence of children has a strong negative effect on
wealth. We also find remarkable differences in wealth accumulation across education groups. Households
whose head has a college education report median total net worth of Dfl37,000, while median total net worth
of households whose head only has an elementary education is Dfl7,860.**
In Figures 4a and 4b we plot mean and median total net worth from 1987 to 1991 for each cohort. The
figures show that there are substantial cohort-time effects as well as age-time effects in total net worth.
Within the same cohort, both mean financial and total net worth are steadily increasing over time. This is
particularly true for the young cohorts, but even for some elderly mean net worth continues to increase over
time. Most of the wealth accumulation is done by the middle age cohorts (households born between 1931
and 1945). The increase in mean total net worth over the 5-year  period is as big as Dfl40,OOO.  The graphs
for total net worth confirm the findings of the means, but further highlight the increase in total net worth for
the middle age cohorts. The fact that mean and median total net worth increase for most cohorts in a
“parallel” way suggests that time effects may also be important. This effect may be due, for example, to
common macro shocks, changes in housing prices or stock market prices.23
21 For comparison, see Smith (1994), who reports differences in wealth holdings across marital status for US households.
22  Similar findings are reported in Bernheim and Scholz (1993),  and Attanasio (1994) using US data.
23 There is  another potential  cause for the existence of these t ime effects.  I t  is  possible that  the amount of measurement
error, and particularly under-reporting of wealth, is decreasing over time. As we noted before, some assets are under-
reported, particularly in the first year, and households may become more accurate in their reports as they repeat
answering the same questions over time. In the econometric specification below we will take this effect into account.
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Looking across cohorts, we find that there are also remarkable differences in wealth accumulation. The
biggest cohort-time effects are experienced by the households born before and during World War II, between
193 1 and 1945. These effects are present both in the mean and in the median. It is noteworthy that
generations born after 1946 do not show as sharp an increase in wealth as older generations. Time effects
could also be relevant in affecting the size and magnitude of the differences in wealth accumulation across
cohorts.
Given the differences between financial net worth and total net worth reported in Table 1, it is useful to
investigate housing equity separately. Housing is an important asset in the household portfolio. As Figure
5 indicates, home-ownership has been increasing over time for the young and middle-age cohorts. Across
cohorts, the increase in home-ownership has been particularly high for the households born between 193 l-
1945. The cohorts born after 1950 exhibit very little cohort-time effects. Not only has home-ownership
increased across the older cohorts, but the prices of homes have also risen considerably between 1984 and
1991 .While  important, home-ownership is, however, not solely responsible for the existence of cohort-time
effects in total net worth . In Figures 6a and 6b we report financial wealth and show that strong cohort-time
effects are still present in the mean and median of this more restrictive measure of wealth.
We have also investigated the effects of capital gains on bonds and stocks on wealth accumulation. The
stock market index went from 62.2 in 1980 to 191.4 in 1991 - an increase of more than 300%. From 1987
to 1991, the increase in the stock market index was 50%. While relevant, this increase affects only a limited
number of households; the percentage of stockholders was only 6.1% in 1987 and 8.8% in 1991. We have
examined the data excluding capital gains on housing and stocks and found that the “cohort-time” effects in
wealth remain sizable. It is therefore unlikely that cohort-time effects can be explained simply by a change
in housing prices or by other time effects, while productivity growth and other economic circumstances
remain potentially important explanations for the pattern of wealth holdings across cohorts.
4. Econometric specification for income
In the econometric analysis, we take an unbalanced panel and consider household income between 1984
and 1989 and household wealth between 1987 and 199 1. Our first objective is to check whether productivity
growth is an important phenomenon and whether we can detect it in household income even after controlling
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for many explanatory variables. Our aim is not to construct a full model of household income dynamics.24
Therefore, we consider the following fairly simple model to describe household income:
5 1989 6 5W,,)=r,  + c rage,;+ c y,TD,  + C ‘iLDi,,  +C  CpisDit,  +xt$  +‘h  +‘th C4)
i=l ~=1985 i=2 i=2
where t = time index, t=1984,..,1989;
h = household index;
2 t h = non-capital income of household h in year t;
ageth = age of the head of the household in year t;
ZD,  = time dummies, equal to one if z=t,  and zero otherwise;
L D ith = learning dummies (to be explained below);
S D ith = selectivity dummies (to be explained below);
X t h = vector of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics;
uh = individual (random) effect;
& t h = random i.i.d. error term.
In equation (4),  we specify a flexible relationship between income and age by considering a fifth order
age polynomial. We have included in the vector of demographic and socio-economic characteristics, xth, the
following variables: number of adults in the households, number of children in different age groups (6 or
younger, between 7 and 12, between 13 and 17, 18 years or older), the gender of the head of the household,
and dummy variables indicating the education level of the head of the household (primary, lower secondary,
higher secondary, and university education).
The individual-specific effect, uh,  in equation (4) represents unobserved heterogeneity. we  want to allow
for the possibility that the individual effects are correlated with other right-hand-side variables. It is well-
known after the work of Mundlak (1978) that this can be done in two equivalent ways. One possibility is to
assume that individual effects are fixed and estimate them as individual parameters. The second possibility,
which we choose, amounts to modeling the individual effect by making it dependent on household specific
means of all time varying right-hand-side variables. Furthermore, we want to allow for cohort effects by
making the individual effects dependent on the year of birth of the household head. Let wth  be the matrix of
24  A more realistic specification would allow for various interactions between age, cohort, and time effects, as, for
example, in MaCurdy  and Mroz (1995) and Weiss and Lillard (1979). However, as Heckman and Robb (1985)
point out, the inclusion of interaction terms aggravates the identification problem.
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all time varying explanatory variables on the right hand side of (4),  plus a column of ones. That is, Wrh
includes Xth,  the time dummies, learning dummies, and selectivity dummies. Define lJ$=  l/T &W,, i.e., the,
time average of Wth. We then model the individual effects as follows:25
1965
‘h = w,  y  + c 6$Dch  + 6, (5)
c=1912
where CD,, = cohort dummies; c = year of birth cohort index, c=l912,..,  1965. We assume that the
individual effects L$ are random and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The inclusion of fixed
individual effects has the additional advantage that it takes care of all selectivity that is dependent on time
invariant factors.26
To allow for the possibility that there are additional attrition effects we have also included the
“selectivity” dummies (SD,,) in the equation. These dummies are defined as follows: SDi,h=  1 if the
household participates in year t and participates at least one more time in the survey after period t. The
dummies pick up the possibility that respondents who participate at least one more year are different from
those who drop out.
To allow for the possibility of learning effects, “learning” dummies (LDi,)  have been included. The
learning dummies are constructed as follows: we have defined dummies for the number of times households
participate in the survey (since the sample period for the income equation covers 6 periods, the maximum
number of times a household participates is equal to 6). Our motivation is that as households participate in
the survey they become either better or worse (for example more lazy) in answering the questionnaire.27
25  Without loss of generality we can omit from I8$  the mean values of the variables age,‘,...,age&  since in a
balanced panel the means are linearly related to cohort specific variables.
26  See Verbeek and Nijman (1992).
27  The idea behind this can be formalized as follows:
Let zth*  be the true value and qh  the measured value of the dependent variable.  Suppose that  the following relat ionship
between the measured and true value of the variable y exists:
z
‘,hth  -  a,+a,e  -3’
l ( )e
zth
0a
with u,  a white noise error term, and where t=l  represents the first interview in which a respondent participates. The
interpretation of this equation would be that the parameter CQ (which is assumed to be positive) determines how quickly
a respondent learns,  i .e.  how quickly the bias in the response converges to ao,  which represents  the amount of  systematic
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Notice that in a balanced panel, LDi,  is just a set of time dummies. In other words, one cannot distinguish
between learning effects and, for example, macroeconomic shocks. However, we work with an unbalanced
panel. A similar comment can be made regarding the selectivity dummies.
If we insert (5) into (4),  the resulting equation explains incomes on the basis of time, cohort, and age
effects. Since birth year plus age is equal to calendar year, these three variables satisfy an exact linear
relationship, which makes it impossible to disentangle time, cohort, and age effects.
4.1 Identification of cohort, age, and time effects
The most general characterization of the identification problem is obtained by representing age effects
by age dummies (one for each age), cohort effects by cohort dummies (one for each birth year), and time
effects by time dummies (one for each time period). To avoid the trivial identification problem due to the
fact that each group of dummies adds up to one, we drop the first dummy of each group. Let us collect all
remaining dummy variables and the vector corresponding to the constant term in a matrix D as follows:
D = [ TD CD AD t ] n,
T-l C-l T+C-2 1
(6)
where n is the total number of observations, the nx(T-  1) -matrix TD contains the time dummies, the
under- or over-reporting in the long run. The parameter a, determines whether initially responses are higher or lower
than the long run response, and by how much. Equation (a) can be rewritten in logarithmic terms as:
Mz,) = ln(z,;l>  + ln(q+a,e  -9’>  + uth (b)
Equation (b)  displays a slightly non-standard measurement error problem. The measurement error consists of two parts:
a random part and a systematic part. The random part, u,~, is a white noise error with expectation zero and constant
variance. The systematic part displays the “learning” effect. If one assumes that the parameters a~,  a,, and q do not
depend on household characteristics, then equation (b) can be rewritten as follows:
0C
where LDjth =l if at time t the household takes part in the panel for the i-th time
4=
0 otherwise
leq)+a,exp(-cq,t))
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nx(C- 1) -matrix CD contains the cohort dummies, the nx(T+C-2).matrix  AD contains the age dummies,
and the (1~x1) -vector t consists of unit-elements exclusively. All dummy variables have been arranged in
increasing order. That is, in TD  the first column refers to the second time period, the second column refers
to the third time period, etc. Similarly, the first column of CDrefers  to the second oldest cohort, the second
column refers to the third cohort, and so on. Let us partition the associated parameter vector q as:
(P / -- ( ‘p:  0: d ‘PO ) . (7)
T-l  C- l  T + C - 2  1
Define:
h -t -
1
2
...
T-l
h -c -
1
2
...
C-l
1
=- Ih CI h -a -
1
2
...
T+C-2
It is easy to verify that the columns of D satisfy the following linear relationship:
- TDh,  + CDh c + ADha - t.(C-1)  = 0
Relation (9) reflects the fact that birth-year plus age equals calendar year.
Partition the matrix CD and the vector ‘pc  as follows:
CD E [CD&b] tp;  E  (q&)
(8)
(9)
where CD, is an n-vector and ‘pcl is a scalar. Furthermore, define:
i.e., D is the matrix of dummy variables obtained by omitting the first time dummy, the first two cohort
dummies, and the first age dummy. Clearly fi spans the same space as D, so we can write:
Dv = &-(p  E  &, (12)
where n: is a vector of “reduced form parameters” and IY  a known (2T + 2C - 4)~(2T + 2C - 3)-
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matrix. We partition z in conformity with fi as follows:
7d  - / / /= ( % In, za ‘It0 )
T-1 c-2 T+C-2 1 l
(13)
The relation between the reduced form parameters n and the structural parameters q~ is as follows:
z,  = 9, + cp,,h, (14)
7Lc = ‘p, -O,]  il, (15)  _
7c  =qla a - %I  h,
no  = q) + cp,~(c-l).
This can be verified by checking that Dtp  = &c.*~
(16)
(17)
The expressions for the reduced form parameters fully characterize the identification of the structural
parameters. We can solve the structural parameters from (14)-(  16) as follows:
Ta = In,  + (p,1  h,
Consider the difference between two adjacent elements of (Pi,  cp,  (Pi :
(20)
0 -t i (Pt,i- 1 = 7E,i - 7cri-l - (PC] i=2,...,T- 1 (21),
ry Y
0 -ci (Pc , i - 1 =  n:ci - nci-l  + ‘pcl i=2,...,C- 1 (22),
(P -ai (Pa,i-1 = zai  - 7cai-l  + (PC1 i=2,...,C+T-2 (23),
** Use (9) to solve for CD,: CD,  = - CI$+TD~,-ADIL~+(C-~)I  .Thisallowsustowrite:
w = TDq, + CD,cpc,  + Cz>  (p,  + ADtpa  + t . ‘p.
=TD  [‘pr+‘p,&l + cBLcP,-~~]‘~l  + AD[(pa-~,,hal + ’ l [cP,-Cp,-(c-1)l l
CI
- Dn,
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AS ‘p,I  is unknown, this formulation makes clear that one cannot identify first differences of parameters. In
particular, this makes it impossible to determine whether age profiles are upward or downward sloping.29  The
same result has been obtained earlier by, for example, Heckman and Robb (1985), Deaton and Paxson
(1994a), Attanasio (1998). The reason to give a derivation, is that it suggests a straightforward solution.
4.2 Modeling of cohort effects
There is a different way of addressing the identification problem, namely by imposing restrictions which
follow from economic theory. The analysis in Section 2 suggested that cohort effects in income and wealth
may be due to productivity growth and changes in SS. In general terms, we impose the following structure
on the cohort effects:
0 -c GY (24)
where G is a (C- 1) xk-matrix of observables (with full column rank) and w a (kxl)  -vector of unknown
parameters. This relation imposes restrictions on the cohort effects and thereby serves to identify all
parameters as long as k<  C-2, where k is the rank of G.
If k is strictly less than C-2 and if the matrix G does not contain the variable ‘year of birth’, (24)
provides overidentifying restrictions of the form CDT, = CDGv. These can be tested using a Wald test.
The alternative hypothesis in the Wald test is a model in which no restrictions are imposed on the vector ‘PC.
This is a non-identified model and can be estimated by arbitrary deleting one cohort, or time, or age dummy,
as explained in section 4.1. An intuitively appealing way of performing the Wald test is to include both CD*
and CDG in the matrix of regressors where the matrix CD’  is obtained from the matrix Cz> (see equation
10) by arbitrarily deleting k columns (cohort dummies) and to test whether the parameters corresponding
with CD* are zero.
Acceptance of the null of no (remaining) cohort effects also avoids the potential problem that the errors
in the equation would exhibit a cohort effect. Such a structure would be different from the assumed error
component structure where there are only individual effects and a white noise error term, and hence would
29  Conceivably, a researcher may be willing to put bounds on q,], e.g. ‘pcl>O implying a cohort effect for cohort
2 to be at least as large as for cohort 1. In that case it follows from (21) that @ti  - ‘p,  i-l “/cti  -7 in, i-l.,
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invalidate all standard errors and statistical inference drawn on the basis of them. In fact the Wald-test
proposed here is closely related to the F-test proposed by Moulton and Randolph (1989) to detect group
effects in the equation errors.
Equation (24) can easily be generalized to the case where additive modeling of cohort effects constitutes
a misspecification in the sense that interactions with other variables (e.g. age) have been incorrectly left out.
Suppose that rather than a term CDG\CI,  the true effect on the left hand side variable of the equation would
have been t;Zt  where Z is some observable variable, which cannot be written as an exact linear combination
of the cohort dummies, and 5  is an unknown parameter. One can still test this null by including both CD and
2 in the matrix of regressors and testing whether the parameters corresponding with CD are zero.
4.3 Empirical results for income
Before implementing the approach suggested above, we first follow Deaton and Paxson  (1994a,  1994b)
and assume that the year dummies are orthogonal to a time trend and sum to zero. We have tested the
hypothesis that the coefficients corresponding to the learning dummies are equal to zero. This hypothesis
cannot be rejected (&5)=6.91,  p=O.23).  The estimation results also suggest that attrition does not lead to
biases in the coefficients of the first moments of the conditional distribution of log non-capital income; the
selectivity dummies are not significant (&4)=3.04,  p=O.55).  We have also tested the joint significance of
the learning and selectivity dummies. The test statistics do not indicate rejection of the null that the
coefficients corresponding to these dummy variables are equal to zero (x2(9)=1  1.75, p=O.23).  We have thus
decided to remove the learning and selectivity dummies from the income equation.3o  The estimation results
are reported in Table 2.
Even though not reported, the demographic variables play an important role in the income equation. We
find that the individual effects are correlated with demographics. The individual effect is, for example,
strongly positively correlated with the education level of the head of the household. This is a very plausible
result: the individual effect picks up some unobserved (time invariant) characteristics like talent and ability
and not surprisingly such characteristics are positively related to education. Many demographic variables
enter the income equation significantly. For example, non-capital income increases by more than 20%
whenever the number of adults increases by one. The presence of young children has a depressing effect on
income. The joint significance of the education and demographic variables (and their means) is very strong
3o  Note, however, that we include these variables in the wealth equation.
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(2(  17)=4089.57).
As Figure 2a already suggested, we find that the cohort dummies are jointly significant (x2(54)=  218.17,
p=O). The polynomial in age is also significant and the parameter estimates indicate a hump-shaped age-
income profile. However, these results are purely an effect of the identifying assumption. With other
identifying assumptions, other patterns could be found.
4.4 An alternative way of accounting for productivity growth
We take the explanation that productivity growth is the reason for the existence of cohort effects in
income one step further. We have created a variable that can measure this effect directly, i.e. the value of real
gross national product per capita (RGNPC) when the head of the household was 22. In this way, we capture
the state of the economy around the time the head of the household entered the labor market. In terms of
equation (24), the matrix G has one column containing the values of RGNPC for all year-of-birth cohorts.
In Figure 7, we plot the behavior of RGNPC for every year-of-birth cohort. RGNPC increases rather steadily
over time, but it experiences variation particularly around the time of recessions.
The alternative specification in which we remove all cohort dummies and add the RGNPC variable (in
logs) is reported in column 2 of Table 2. As before, we have excluded learning and selectivity dummies since
they are not statistically significant. The coefficient of aggregate income when the head of household was
22 is positive (0.358) and statistically significant (s.e.  0.078). This result gives support to the hypothesis that
productivity growth is an important explanatory variable for household income.
We find that the coefficients of the demographic variables (and their means) are very similar to the other
specification. Furthermore, we find that the coefficients of the time dummies are highly significant. Note that
in this case we do not need to make any identifying assumptions concerning the time dummies.
It could be the case that the RGNPC variable, while accounting for the growth in the economy over the
past, is also picking up the business cycle conditions when entering the job markets. To verify the sensitivity
of results to our chosen specification, we have also considered an average of GNPC per capita from age 20
to age 24. Results are virtually unchanged and we work hereafter simply with the RGNPC variable.31
We have also considered the cross-sectional specification for income, which does not include any cohort
effects (specification 3 in Table 2). In Figure 8, we plot the age-earnings profile resulting from that
31 We have also considered different measures of aggregate production such as real disposable income per capita, and
results do not change. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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specification together with the specification using RGNPC. The cross-section profile differs a lot from the
profile that accounts for cohort effects. In particular, it reaches a top rather early, and it declines sharply
afterwards with age.
Since in our specification we do not have to make any assumptions on the time dummies, we can also test
whether the restriction on these dummies is supported by the data. As already apparent in Table 2, the
hypothesis that the time dummies are orthogonal to a time trend is rejected at the 1% level (2  (1) =7.57)
As suggested before, we have also tested the specification using RGNPC against a specification with a
full set of cohort dummies.32 The Wald test indicates rejection at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level of
significance.33 As one can see from Table 2, in comparison with the specification without the RGNPC
variable the $-statistic for the joint significance of the cohort dummies falls by 21.1. Our simple proxy for
productivity growth is obviously an important explanatory variable. On the other hand, the cohort variables
remain jointly significant indicating that household incomes are affected by more than just productivity
differences at the start of one’s working life. Some of these have already been mentioned, such as increases
in participation rates and decreases in household sizes, or the existence of potential interactions of age, time,
and cohort effects. It may also be the case that differences in the sizes of various cohorts affects their
economic fortunes (see, e.g., Easterlin, Schaeffer,  and Macunovich (1993)). Since the emphasis of the paper
is on wealth and not on income, we abstain from any further analysis of the cohort effects in income.
5. Econometric specification for wealth
Despite the relatively simple income process postulated in the previous section, the implied equation for
household wealth is already quite complicated, particularly if one wants to properly account for
demographics. Some of these complications are sketched in Appendix B. As a first approximation, the initial
specification for wealth will be taken to be similar to that for income. There are two main differences. The
flirst difference is trivial; since the data for wealth cover 1987-199 1 rather than 1984-1989,  some of the t ime
indices have a different range. The second difference has to do with the left hand side variable: zi, is now
32 As mentioned before, we have to remove one cohort dummy to perform the Wald test.
“One could argue that the alternative model is maximally ‘non-parametric.’ For example, one concern is that this
test artificially inflates the degrees of freedom. We can impose more structure by using a more parsimonious
(nonlinear) cohort function using a fifth order polynomial in years of birth. If we test the specification using
RGNPC against this more heavily parameterized model, the Wald test still indicates rejection at the 5%-level  but not
at the 1% level. Thus, the test results presented in the main text are not simply driven by an “overparameterization”
of the alternative hypothesis.
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wealth. As mentioned before, a sizable proportion of households hold zero or negative net worth
(approximately 9 percent of the sample). This precludes the use of a log-transformation. On the other hand,
the wide dispersion of the net worth distribution, with a small number of households holding huge amounts
of wealth, makes a log-like transformation desirable. Hence we use the hyperbolic sine as a transformation
of net worth:
where zth is net worth of household h at time t. The hyperbolic sine is anti-symmetric, i.e., h(z)=-h(-z).  The
function approximates the logs for positive values of net worth that are not too small (and minus the log for
negative values of net worth) and hence shares the property that it down weighs extreme observations.
As was the case with income, we estimate a random effects model as implied by equations (4) and (5)
with the inclusion of household specific means of time varying explanatory variables. In the case of wealth,
learning dummies and selectivity dummies affect the estimates of the time dummies. Therefore, we always
include both the selectivity and the learning dummies. We model the profile of wealth over the life cycle with
a fifth order polynomial in age.
As with income, cohort effects will be modeled as a function of productivity growth. But now we also
include a variable that represents changes in SS over the years of one’s working life. By assuming that
individuals in society take every change in SS as permanent and that preferences are quadratic, we can derive
exactly how the time path of SS provisions should influence the wealth accumulation of different cohorts
(see appendix A and, in particular, equation (A. 19)). The variable thus constructed is denoted as DSS. We
test whether productivity growth and SS are sufficient to capture all cohort effects in the data. Finally we
perform various tests of our specification by considering various interactions and testing whether the
associated coefficients are zero.
5.1 Empirical results for wealth accumulation
Table 3 contains the estimation results for both total and financial net worth. Demographic variables turn
out to be very significant in the estimation of wealth. Households whose head is highly educated (higher
secondary education and above) have higher wealth than households whose head has a low education.
Additionally, the presence of small children has a depressing effect on wealth.
We find evidence for a displacement effect of SS on wealth. The variable measuring the cohort effect of
2 1
SS (MDsS)34  is negative and statistically significant. DSS,  which measures the interactions between cohort
and age effects is not statistically significant. In other words, changes in SS between 1987 and 1991
(captured by the variable DSS) did not affect wealth accumulation, while changes in SS in the past (captured
by MDSS)  did. A test of this model against a model with a full set of cohort dummies and Dss3’  does not lead
to rejection (~=0.720).~~
We have also considered the extent of cohort effects in the other measure of wealth, financial net worth.
The coefficients of DXS  and lMDSS  are both negative and jointly statistically significant (f (2) =9.09,
p=O.Ol).  The test on the validity of this model against a model with a full set of cohort dummies again does
not lead to rejection (p=O.911).  We note that although RGNPC has the expected sign in all cases, it is not
significantly different from zero.
Figures 9a  and 9b  present the age-wealth profiles (using the hyperbolic sine) for different generations
using the estimates reported in Table 3.37 For all generations considered in these figures, the age function
tends to start sloping downward around retirement (for the 1911 generation) or shortly after retirement (for
the younger generations), as would be predicted by various versions of the PI-LCH. Furthermore, due to the
effect of (the introduction of) SS the amount of decumulation after retirement of the 1935, and 1946
generations is smaller than that of the 1911 generation, as would be predicted by the model presented in
Section 2. To verify whether decumulation of wealth becomes significantly negative, Figures 10a  and 10b
present the relative change in wealth from year to year (with 95% confidence bands around them) for the
19 11 generation. The point estimates confirm that there is decumulation in both financial wealth and net
worth, which starts around the time of retirement. However, the confidence bands are large and decumulation
is not statistically significant for that cohort.
To assess the impact of SS, we can look at the relative change in net worth. Figure 10 suggests that for
the reference cohort (1911 generation) the yearly increase in net worth between ages 22 and 35 varied
between 18% and 23%. These figures are considerably lower for the 1935 generation, namely between 4%
34  MDSS is the household specific average of SS over the sample period. In a balanced panel, MDSS is simply a
cohort specific variable. Notice that the variable MDSS embodies all changes in the SS system which took place
before 1987 (the beginning of the sample period). The coefficient corresponding to DSS is identified due to the
interaction of the cohort and age effect and to changes in the SS system between 1987 and 1991.
35 Note that this variable is an interaction term and therefore is not perfectly collinear with a full set of cohort
dummies.
36  As for income, this result is not driven by an “overparameterization” of the alternative model.
37 Since we are interested in the displacement effect of SS, we keep producti v i ty growth constant  in  the f igures .
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and 8.5%. The yearly increase between age 35 and 45 were from 19% to 23% for the 1911 generation, while
they varied from  8% to 16% for the 1935 generation. Thus, in comparison with the cohorts that lived without
SS for a part of their working life, the cohorts that had SS throughout their working life have less than half
the accumulation rate of older cohorts.
5.2 Extensions
As is made clear in Appendix B, the model for wealth considered here can only be an approximation to
a true model. In particular, we have ignored various interactions between fixed effects, productivity variables,
and demographics. To investigate the extent to which our results would be affected by such simplification,
we have considered several tests and modifications of our model. The first modification we investigate
concerns the demographic variables, such as family size and number of children, considered in the
estimation. In principle, the wealth equations should contain the complete time path of these variables since
the beginning of one’s (working) life. Since this information is unavailable, only current values have been
included. As an approximation, one may assume that all these variables can be written as some function of
age times a household specific constant. In that case the equation for wealth becomes a function of age
interacted with several other variables like productivity, education and individual effects. Demographics then
drop out, by construction (See equation (B. 13)). The empirical estimates of this reduced specification
indicate some changes, although our main results remain the same. In particular, the SS variable continues
to remain statistically significant in the case of total net worth. Financial net worth shows similar results with
and without these demographics variables.38
As mentioned before, the chosen specification assumes that age, time, and cohort effects are additive. We
have only allowed for interactions between the cohort and age effects in DSS. Clearly, there can be more
complicated dynamics in wealth. We have therefore interacted the variables measuring cohort effects with
time dummies, and with the polynomial in age. Our empirical estimates show that the interaction terms are
not statistically significant.
As a further check for the existence of interactions and potentially other higher order terms, we work with
savings which we derived by taking the first difference of (the hyperbolic sine of) wealth.39  As we have seen
38 For brevity, these estimates are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.
39  There are a few problems to consider when working with wealth in first differences. First, note that a large part of
the f i rs t differences in wealth could be accounted for by capital  gains on s tocks  and housing. Both  s tock and housi ng
prices increased considerably in the period under consideration, even though, as we mention before,  few households
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in Section 2, and as was pointed out earlier by Deaton and Paxson  (1994a,b)  and Paxson  (1996),  savings rates
(or relative changes in wealth) should display no cohort effects.
In the equations we estimate, we consider all the demographic variables and education in first differences,
a fourth order polynomial in age, and three time dummies. In none of the specifications displayed in Table
4, are the variables proxying for the cohort effects statistically significant.40  The null of no cohort effects is
always accepted. These findings indicate that the additive structure we use may provide a good
approximation for the behavior of wealth across different cohorts.
6. Conclusions
We have examined the income and wealth holdings of different cohorts. Many reasons have been
proposed in the literature to explain why consumers born in different time periods have different paths of
saving and wealth accumulation. People can differ in their tastes. For example, generations who lived
through the Great Depression or World War II may be thriftier and more alert to risk than other generations.
Additionally, generations could be different due to the diversity of economic conditions during their working
lives. For example, the economy could have experienced high growth in wages, and changes in the SS
system.
Our strategy consists of devising indicators that can summarize the economic conditions over time. A
good proxy for the differences in the income profiles of households turns out to be GNP per capita around
the time that the head of the household entered the labor market. Similarly, we have devised a proxy for the
changes in the SS system at the beginning of or during the working life of the head of the household.
We find that income depends on productivity growth and that productivity growth and SS go a long way
toward explaining the differences in wealth holdings across cohorts. One of the main features of the postwar
economic development in the Netherlands has not only been the sharp increase in wages in the sixties, but
also the rapid growth in the SS system. Both affect the wealth accumulation of people born in different
periods of time. Given that we find that after inclusion of these variables, cohort effects are no longer
hold stocks. Second, wealth has a very dispersed distribution which becomes even more dramatic when taking first
differences. To be consistent with the previous results and to account for the high variation in wealth and saving, we
continue to work with the hyperbolic sine transformation and take the difference of the transformed wealth levels rather
than the levels themselves. This measure corresponds approximately to relative changes in wealth.
4o We have performed these regressions for changes in financial net worth and results are the same. None of the
variables indicating cohort effects are statistically significant.
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significant, one may conjecture that differences across cohorts in wealth accumulation are not the result of
differences in tastes, but rather due to differences in economic circumstances. The empirical estimates
suggest that in comparison with the cohorts that lived without SS for a portion of their working life (they
were born in 191 l), the cohorts that always had SS (they were born in 1935 and after) have less than half the
accumulation rates of older generations, in particular at young ages.
As mentioned in Section 2, there are other economic conditions that could be important for explaining
the (cohort) differences in wealth accumulation, including precautionary motives, uncertain life time,
(unanticipated) increases in house prices, bequest motives, changes in demographics and female labor supply.
Undoubtedly, these factors play a role. The strategy in this paper has been, however, to simplify the model
of wealth accumulation as far as possible and to still be able to explain important features of the data. We
plan to investigate these other economic factors in future research.
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Appendix A: Social Security and wealth holdings.
We start the analysis by considering the closed-form solution for wealth in the PI-LCH. Initially, we
abstract from the impact of productivity growth on wealth holdings. In what follows, we maintain the
assumptions that preferences are quadratic and intertemporally separable and that the interest rate equals the
rate of time preference. The inter-temporal budget constraint is written as:
5 = (1 +r)Atal  + yt - A, (A.1)
where yt is non-capital income at age t, r is the interest rate, A, is wealth at the end of period t, c,  is
consumption in period t. We adopt the convention that all income (both capital income and non-capital
income) is received at the end of each period; the same holds for the timing of consumption.
It is rather easy to see that consumption in period t is equal to:
where L is the time horizon, Et is the expectation operator conditional upon all information available at time
t. From (A.1)  and (A.2) one can derive that at the end of period t at wealth A satisfies the following equation:
A, = (1 +#A0 + (1 +r)‘-‘yl  + (1 +r)‘-2EIy2 + . . +E, yt -
i 1
(l+rF1 Ypl+(l+‘)f-2(y2-E1y2)+...  +(yt-qy,)-
(( (lir):l-1) (C2-E,C,) +( (I-.)3@ x24 +...  .,;,,,,)
(A.3)
where Y,,  is permanent income evaluated in period 1 of the life cycle, defined as:
(A-4)
One can verify (A.3) by inserting the expressions for A, and At-1  into the intertemporal budget constraint (A. 1)
and by using the martingale property of consumption: c,  =E,  c,,  .
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The first part of (A.3) (until Y,,) simply says that in the absence of new information, wealth is equal to
(expected) accumulated saving. During the life cycle, new information becomes available so that the
consumer replans his/her consumption and wealth paths. The remainder of the equation displays the effects
of the revisions in income and the revisions in the consumption path respectively. We can elaborate equation
(A.3) further:
A, = (1 +#A0 + (1 +r)‘-lyl  + (1 +r)t-2EIy2 + . . +E, y, - Ypl+(l+r)‘-2(y2-E1y2)+...+(yr-Elyl)-
f - li 1(l+r)  - 1 kc )1 +r 2-2 -l Lc (1  +r)2”(E2  -E&-I=2 ( (1’rr2e1)[  ~(l+r)3~)~1’$(l+r)3~T(E3-EJyT
- . . . - -lk  (1 +r)“(E,  - EtBl)yT
z=t (A*%
This expression is useful to highlight the effects on wealth of both the introduction of SS and later revisions
in the level of SS. We assume that individuals hold static expectations concerning the future level of SS4’.
That is, at each age k they plan their consumption as if the level of SS will remain constant during the course
of their lifetime. Furthermore, we initially assume that individuals ignore any possible feedback effect of SS
on their current income (e.g. through a change in taxes). If a revision takes place the individuals update their
expectations to the new SS-level. One can use (AS) to trace the effects of the introduction of SS and
subsequent revisions on the accumulation of wealth.
First consider the effect on wealth of someone who has not retired yet. Assume that individuals retire at
age L,,  i.e. they start receiving SS in period L,+ 1, so we consider the case where t+.  Using (AS) we fEst
look at the effects of SS on YPl.  Let 2LS1  be the level of SS anticipated by the individual when his age is 1.
Using (A.4) one sees immediately that relative to a situation without SS,Y,, is only affected by the term:
Next we notice that in (AS) all income terms dated earlier than t are by assumption unaffected by changes
in SS. The only other terms affected by changes in SS are the terms involving the update in expectations from
one period to the next. For example, for kst we have the following effect of a change in SS at age k:
41 Or equivalently, that shocks in SS are taken to be permanent.
27
z=k
= (l+r) k-L, 1- (1 +rpL
z=L1+1 r I . SS; (A3
where SSk  is the level of SS anticipated at age k, and SSk*=SSk-SSk-l  for k22.
Defining S&*=S$  and inserting (A.6) and (A.7) into (AS) we obtain the following “displacement” effect,
of SS (in comparison to a world without SS) on the wealth holdings of individuals of age t who are not
retired yet:
t
= -DSS,  - c
k=l
For retired individuals (t>L,)  the analysis is quite a bit simpler. To start we note that the effect of SS on their
wealth holdings at retirement (i.e. at the end of period I,,)  is obtained from (A.@  by inserting t=L,. This
yields:
- -- c
k=l
L,-k+l(l+r) -1
(1  +d L-k+1  -1
L-L*(l+r)  -1
r
VW
Next we observe that under our assumptions any change in SS after retirement is considered to be permanent
by the individual, and hence translates into a corresponding change in consumption. As a result, wealth
holdings after retirement are not affected by changes in SS that take place after L,. Hence, the effect of SS
on wealth holdings after retirement is obtained by considering the time path along which DSS,,  is consumed
towards the end of the life cycle. In each period an amount:
(A. 10)
will be consumed. Thus at age t>L,  the effect of SS on wealth holdings is equal to:
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(A.11)
Let us now relax the assumption that the introduction of SS does not affect the income of the working
population. Instead we assume that corresponding to a given level SS  a payroll tax is levied equal to CVCC.  For
simplicity we take (1~  to be a constant. This would, for instance, correspond to a stationary population and a
strict pay-as-you-go system. In that case c1  is equal to the ratio of the number of SS recipients to the number
of workers. We will see below that a generalization to a non-constant a is straightforward.
Once again we take (AS) as a starting point. First consider the effect of the payroll tax associated with
SS,  on YPI . Using (A.4) we obtain a negative effect of a permanent payroll tax of a$+&  on YPI  equal to:
L(l+r>  -(l+r> L-4
(1 +r)L  - 1
(A. 12)
In addition, the income terms on the first line of (AS) up to YP1  are affected. The total effect of a payroll tax
equal to aSS,  on these income terms is equal to
((1 +ry-l  +(I  +ry2 + . . . + l)axs,  = (l+#  -l cLss,
r
(A.13)
Combining (AS), (A. 12),  and (A. 13) we find the total negative effect of a payroll tax equal to aSS, on
wealth accumulation at age t to be equal to:
clss (I+#  -1 (1 +r)LmL1  -1
1 r i I(1 +r)L-  1
(A. 14)
Now consider the effect of a change in SS at age k. This effect also consists of two parts. The first part is:
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[(l,r)‘-k+(l+r)‘-k-1  +... +l]aqy = (l+r)f-k+*  -l a#;
r
The second part is:
-m;[ :‘;‘-I)[ 4”-‘-I[ “i’=
-ass; 1 r>+ t-k+1  -1 (1  ++k+l - (1  +r)L-Ll(1  +r> L-k+1  -1 r
Adding both parts yields:
L-L,(l+r)  -1
(1  +r)L-k+1  -1
(A. 15)
(A. 16)
(A. 17)
Comparing (A. 17) to (A. 14) shows that (A. 17) applies for all k, also k=l. Finally, by aggregating over
all kst,  we obtain for the total effect of the payroll tax on wealth at age t:
(A. 18)
Comparing this to (A.8),  we observe that apart from a factor a, (A. 18) is exactly equal to (A.8). The
intuition for this is straightforward. Under the assumptions made, consumption is constant across the life
cycle. Given the age of retirement, savings during the working life are exclusively a function of the
difference in incomes between retirement and the working life. An increase in income during retirement
therefore has exactly the same effect as a reduction in income during the working life.
A generalization to the case where the payroll tax varies across age is straightforward. The factor a is
replaced by q and in (A. 18) ak  is moved under the summation sign.
Finally, the case where t>L,  is an obvious adaptation of (A. 11): one simply pre-multiplies (A. 11) by a.
The total effect of SS after retirement and a payroll tax before retirement is (l+a)  times (A.8) and (A. 11)
respectively.
In our empirical work, we compute (A.8) and (A. 11) for all possible ages t and for all generations which
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we observe in our sample. These expressions for the SS-effect are next adjusted in two ways. The first
adjustment is related to the functional form for wealth chosen in our empirical work (the hyperbolic sine;
see Section 4),  and the second to the fact that there is productivity growth in the economy. Note that the SS
variable is derived under the assumption of no productivity growth. In order to correct for productivity
growth and for the fact that the hyperbolic sine of wealth is our dependent variable, we have replaced DSS,
in equations (A.@  and (A. 11) by the following expression:
(A.19)
where the superscript g indicates generation g and the superscript r the ‘reference generation’. The exact
expression of the terms ak within the sum sign which depend on L,  L,  and the interest rate Y,  directly follow
from equations (A.8) and (A. 11). Equation (A. 19) can be justified by a crude approximation, which follow
from ‘log-linearizing’ the wealth equation. In doing the log-linearization of the wealth equation, however,
we have to be rather careful in choosing the reference group. The 19 11 generation (the oldest generation in
our sample) seems a reasonable choice of reference group. The log-linearized version of the model is not
used to predict the wealth profile of the generation without any SS. Since such households are not observed
in our sample, the quality of the log-linear approximation can become rather poor.
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Appendix B: Demographic translating and scaling, human capital and productivity growth.
In this appendix we investigate the effects of demographics and differences in productivity and human capital
on the lifetime wealth profiles of cohorts. The main purpose is to characterize the various interactions
between these effects in the determination of household wealth. For simplicity we assume complete certainty.
Demographic translating and scaling
Consider the following maximization problem:
L
1max -?cpf-’
t=l
s-t. c, = (1 +r)Atml  +yt  -A,
A, given, A,=0
f
l t
where g142 and-f;  are functions of the composition of the household. Assume as in Section 2, that the time
preference rate and interest rate are equal, i.e. p=(  I+@. Ignore the scaling parameter .f;  for the moment.
Define c,* =ct  -gr  and yt* =yt-gr  and rewrite the maximization problem as
L
max C p’-’  - + c,f
t=l
( r
s.t. c,* = (1 +r)Atel  +yt+  -A, W)
A, given, A,=0
This is now in exactly the same form as given in Section 2 with c,*  replacing ct.  The solution for wealth at
age t is therefore
with YP*  defmed  as
42  Note that g includes the “Bliss” level of consumption.
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The introduction of the scale parameter-J  complicates the expression for wealth somewhat more. With some
straightforward but slightly tedious algebra we find that the expression for A, obtained by taking into account
both translating and scaling is:
with
A, =(l +r)*-1 (1 +r)A,+h  (1 +r)‘-‘(yT  -gT -.fi2T)
z=l
Human  capital and productivity growth
Consistent with the specification for household income given in Section 4 (cf. (5)) we specify the following
equation for income at age z:
where we have ignored time dummies for notational simplicity. For the rest, income is decomposed in a
household specific effect ky,  a function of age, h(7),  a function of possibly varying explanatory variables (like
education), q(q),  and a cohort effect which may include productivity differentials across cohorts, w(c). As
a result of this specification, we can write:
Inserting this in (B.5) we obtain:
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A, = (1 +r)‘-1 (1 +r)A, + k,.w(c).~  (1  +r)‘-‘h(Q.cp(x,)  -2 (1 +r)1-‘(gz+afi2q)
z=l T=l
Clearly, (B.9) comprises various unobservable terms pertaining to the past. A simple way to get around this
difficulty is to assume that we may approximate various time varying expressions as a product of an age
function and a household specific effect:
where kf and kg  are household specific constants and the functions $ g,  AI,  AZ are left unspecified. This allows
us to approximate (B.9) as follows:
For an easy interpretation of this expression, define the following quantities:
(1 +r)‘A o  =  s,(t).k,; (1 +r)‘-‘h(z). h( )z =tc (1 + r)‘-‘[  kR  .g(z)  +flT)2q.k;] =. k, l s,(t) +
(B.11)
(B. 12)
6 (04 l Yk
2
P. f
z=l
where kA is a household specific constant. Thus we can rewrite (B. 11) as follows:
From (B. 13) one can see that the expression for household wealth depends on complicated interactions
between household specific  constants, age functions, and productivity variables. The essentially log-linear
form we have adopted for the description of the wealth holdings of households therefore cannot be more than
a crude approximation of the true linear form. To gauge the extent to which our approximation is adequate
it is important to test for the statistical significance of the various possible interactions, as has been done in
Section 5.2.
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Table 1: Distribution of Financial and Total Net Worth
Distribution
10’ percentile
25ti percentile
Median
75* percentile
90* percentile
99* percentile
Mean
Financial
Net Worth
1987
-1571
2000
9220
22300
44000
223382
20294
Total
Net Worth
1987
-1200
2764
16923
72203
154193
482500
55718
Financial
Net Worth
1991
-609
2790
12183
30226
65567
288776
28835
Total
Net Worth
1991
9
4571
25111
93712
198094
571674
73082
This table reports the distribution of financial and total net worth in 1987 and 1991 across percen tiles. All
values are expressed in 1987 Dutch Guilders.
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Table 2: Household Income
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Variables estimate st. error estimate st. error estimate st. error
ln(RGNPC) 0.358 0.078
age/IO 10.972 1.749 10.207 1.429 8.876 1.400
(age/lo)* -4.671 0.802 -4.370 0.652 -3.661 0.633
(age/l0)3 0.997 0.176 0.930 0.143 0.750 0.138
(age/lO)4 -0.104 0.019 -0.097 0.015 -0.076 0.014
(age/l0)5 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.001
time dummy (year=1985) -0.007 -0.001 0.008 0.009 0.008
time dummy (year= 1986) 0.004 0.004 0.018 0.009 0.038 0.008
time dummy (year=1987) -0.010 0.004 0.013 0.010 0.043 0.008
time dummy (year=1988) 0.001 0.004 0.033 0.012 0.073 0.008
time dummy (year=1989) 0.005 0.003 0.046 0.014 0.096 0.008
constant -1.714 1.472 -3.767 1.566 0.905 1.190
demographics yes yes yes
cohort dummies yes no no
Overall R* 0.4499 0.4435 0.4427
Wald test of the hypothesis that coefficients of the time dummies are ortho gonal to a time trend
7.57 90.57
degrees of freedom 1 1
p-value 0.0059 o.oooo
Wald test against a model with a full set of cohort dummies
73.42 94.48
degrees of freedom 52 53
p-value 0.0268 o.ooo4
Note: This table reports the estimation results for household income in lo gs. The number of observations is 18,485.
Even though not qorted,  the regressions contain demographic variables for gender, education, number of children, and
number of adults in the household. In the bottom panel, the table reports two Wald tests. Refer to the text for a
discussion of these tests.
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Table 3 : Household Wealth
Variables
ln(RGNPC)
DSS
MDSS
DSS
MDSS
age/l0
(age/lo)*
(age/10)3
(age/l0)4
(age/l0)5
time dummy (year=1988)
time dummy (year=1989)
time dummy (year=1990)
time dummy (year=1991)
constant
demographics
Total Net Worth
Cohort effects: Prod. Growth &
s. security
estimate standard error
1.551 1.308
1.716 2.725
-4.278 1.087
-4.982 25.554
2.704 10.931
-0.443 2.3 10
0.03 1 0.237L
-0.001 0.009I
-0.334 0.414
-0.341 0.43 1
0.011 0.508
0.234 0.619r
3.105 23.536
/
Financial Net Worth
Cohort effects: Prod. Growth &
s. security
estimate standard error
0.935 1.356
-2.5 10 2.908
-0.813 1.171 I
36.039 27.346
-13.532 11.702
2.615 2.473
-0.245 0.254 A
0.009 0.010
-0.337 0.457
-0.423 0.474
0.285 0.557
0.604 0.678
-34.97 1 25.175
Overall R* 0.09 1 0.067
Wald test of the hypothesis that coefficients of the time dummies are ortho gonal to a time trend
J*( 1) (p-value) 0.03 1 (0.860) I 0.160 (0.693)
Wald test of the hpothesis  on the joint significance of the SS variables
J 2 (2) (p-value) 45.970 (0.ooo) 9.090 (0.011)
Wald test against a model with a full set of cohort dummies 1
J 2 (52) (p-value) I 45.660 (0.720) I 38.900 (0.911)
Note: This table reports the estimation results for household net worth and financial wealth transformed usin g the
hyperbolic sine. The number of observations is 17,154. Even thou gh not reported, the regressions contain demographic
variables for gender, education, number of children, and number of adults in the household. In the bottom panel, the
table reports three Wald tests. Refer to the text for a discussion of these tests.
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Table 4: Household Saving
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
estimate~ I st. error estimate I st. error estimate I st. error estimate I ~st. error
-0.783 1 0.799 -0.993 0.798
-0.680 1 6.381
-0.044  I -0.084 0.11
0.015 0.115
-0.165 1 0.115
3.039 1 5.667 -0.591 1 4.758
-4.129 1 4.682 -0.720 1 1.739 0.304 I 1.505
0.468 1 0.642 0.053 1 0.224 0.047 1 0.225 -0.059 0.203
0.004 0.01
0.791 I 5.411
ohort dummies
Yes Yes ves ves
no noyes no
0.0060 0.0046 0.0044 0.0042
This table reports the estimation results for savin g, which are derived by first differencing the hyperbolic sine of
wealth. Variables startin  g with A indicate first differences. The number of observations is 12,204.
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Figure la: The effect of the introduction of social security on consumption
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Figure lb: The effect of the introduction of social security on wealth
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Figure 8: The age income profiles according to 2 different models
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Figure 9a: age net worth profile for different cohorts
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Figure 9b: age financial wealth profile for different cohorts
- - - - - v - w. _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - m - v
. - w - - - e - - - - - - - - -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - s - v
_ - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ - - - - w - - e_ - - e - s - - -
_ - _ - _ - - - - - - - e m _ _ - - - - - - - - - s - v _ _ - - - - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - -
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
age
- cohort 1935 + cohort 1911 (reference) - cohort 1946
5 1
0.6 ___-_-_-___---_-----_--
0.4 --_-b--w---------
0.2
.E3
0
Figure 1Oa: The relative change in net worth (and 95% confidence bands) across age of
the generation born in 1911
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Figure lob:  The relative change in financial wealth (and 95%-confidence  bands) across
age of the generation born in 1911
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